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Private citizen actions may lead to disputes between neighboring gov-
ernments. Paris' abduction of Helen triggered the Greeks' siege of
Troy. As a less momentous example, the private erection of skyscrap-
ers in a central city might impair television reception in one of its sub-
urbs and precipitate angry exchanges between the mayors of the two
cities.
This Article examines the possible utility of creating public ('ie.,
intergovernmental) rights and duties to internalize intergovernmental
spillovers of this sort. The Article focuses particularly on cases similar
to the examples just given where a government's rights and duties
would be vicarious in that they would stem from the private behavior,
or private suffering, of its citizens. Lawyers and scholars are relatively
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familiar with theproprietary rights and obligations that may arise from
a government's own affirmative activities-for instance, its ownership
of public lands, its employment of police, or its operation of a munici-
pal waterworks. Much less familiar is the notion that the government-
citizen relationship should give rise to the legal consequence that a gov-
ernment stands (vicariously) in the shoes of its citizens-e.g., that Troy
is liable to Greece, assuming both are recognized political units, for
Paris' abduction of Helen.
A more extended example, which will be invoked throughout the
Article, will help illustrate the possible merits of creating vicarious pub-
lic rights and duties. Suppose that dozens of private factories situated
in Springfield, Massachusetts, dump wastes into the Connecticut River,
and that these pollutants flow southward and annoy thousands of resi-
dents of the State of Connecticut. In designing an antipollution policy,
Massachusetts officials might disregard these cost spillovers because
Massachusetts residents do not bear them. Like other externalities,
these spillovers might cause both the misallocation of resources and
troublesome wealth transfers.
Policy analysts have traditionally emphasized two techniques for
internalizing interjurisdictional cost spillovers. t Both techniques bring
into play a higher-level government whose boundaries encompass both
the source of the spillover and the entire geographic area the spillover
affects. The first traditional technique requires this higher-level gov-
ernment to regulate the activity in question. In the Connecticut River
example, this approach would call for the federal government to regu-
late those who pollute interstate waterways.2 The second traditional
technique is for the higher-level government to manipulate its mone-
tary transfers with its lower-level governments so as to induce the
lower-level governments to consider spillover effects on neighboring ju-
risdictions. This technique typically involves: (1) grants-in-aid from
higher-level governments in support of lower-level government pro-
grams that generate benefit spillovers; and (2) monetary penalties as-
sessed by higher-level governments against political subdivisions that
generate cost spillovers. In the Connecticut River example, the federal
government would be using this technique if it placed a monetary
1. See, e.g., G. BREAK, INTERGOVERNMENTAL FISCAL RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES
175 (1967).
2. This could involve federal creation of river basin authorities, an often-endorsed ap-
proach. See, e.g., E. MILLS, THE ECONOMICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 245-47 (1978); Rob-




figure on the damage Massachusetts' pollutants caused in Connecticut,
and deducted that amount from Massachusetts' share of federal reve-
nue-sharing funds.
These two traditional techniques do not exhaust the policy alterna-
tives. As a third technique, the all-encompassing government might
carefully define property rights between the private parties involved in
the spillover (assuming it was privately engendered) and provide them
an enforcement mechanism such as a system of civil courts. An appro-
priate definition of these private property rights would increase the
likelihood that the affected parties would reach an efficient settlement
of the dispute through bargaining or litigation. Many intergovernmen-
tal spillovers, however, involve large numbers of private parties. In the
Connecticut River example, dozens of industrial firms in one state to-
gether caused the injury to thousands of residents of another state. As
in all large number cases, there would be incentives for individual par-
ties to become holdouts and freeloaders.3 This tendency would greatly
increase the costs of, or even obviate, the two sides arranging a settle-
ment. Even if procedural devices such as class actions were made
available, the administrative costs involved in the private property
rights technique of internalization would often be unacceptable.
As previously mentioned, this Article focuses on a fourth tech-
nique, little explored in public finance literature: the creation of vicar-
ious intergovernmental rights and duties designed to internalize
privately engendered intergovernmental spillovers. This technique will
be called a system of "public property rights." These public property
rights are affirmative rights and obligations that a higher-level govern-
ment creates, not between the private individuals involved in a trans-
boundary spillover, but rather between their lower-level governments.
This system may in some situations overcome the large-number prob-
lem inherent in the private property rights approach, while still pre-
serving some measure of decentralized enforcement. Dozens of
Springfield industrialists cannot readily bargain with thousands of
Connecticut residents, but officials of their two states could conceivably
negotiate an efficient settlement of the pollution problem along the
Connecticut River.
The few commentators who have considered---"touched on"
would be more descriptive-affirmative intergovernmental property
rights have generally been pessimistic about the utility of this internal-
3. See Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View
of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1089, 1106-07 (1972).
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ization technique.4 They sometimes support their gloomy assessment
by pointing to the unpromising history of interstate air and water pollu-
tion compacts in the United States. The thesis of this Article is that the
creation of public property rights, although far from being a cure-all
for intergovernmental coordination, may have more potential than has
previously been recognized.
The first three parts of the Article are mainly concerned with pri-
vately engendered costs that spill across government boundaries.- Part
16 compares the various internalization devices available and identifies
the niche where intergovernmental property rights might prove to be a
useful policy tool. Part III outlines some suggested substantive rules of
public property. Part 1118 uses those suggested rules to criticize the
small but fascinating body of decisional law that has developed out of
international, interstate, and interlocal litigation over cost spillovers.
Part III also suggests how legislatures might establish a public property
rights system. The Article ends with Part IV,9 a short discussion of the
use of public property rights to internalize beneft spillovers from gov-
ernment programs.
I. THE NICHE FOR INTERGOVERNMENTAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS
When a privately created cost spills across a property line, legal ana-
lysts have typically focused their attention on structuring the rights and
duties of the landowners on either side of the line. Where the property
line is also a government boundary, however, the two governments that
share the common boundary also become prime candidates for receiv-
ing affirmative legal entitlements and obligations.
A party may of course participate in bargaining to ameliorate a
cost spillover even when the party has no affirmative rights or duties.
Suppose, for example, that a fence on Rancher's land would be a cost-
4. R. POSNER, ECONoMIc ANALYSIS OF LAW § 26.3, at 516-18 (2d ed. 1977); Stewart, Pyra.
mids of Sacr~fce? Problems of Federalism in Mandating State Implementation of National En viron.
mental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196, 1216, 1228 & n.126 (1977); Zerbe, Optimal Environmental
Jurisdictions, 4 ECOLOGY L.Q. 193, 226-27, 242-43 (1974). For a somewhat more optimistic as-
sessment, see R. MUSGRAVE & P. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 626-27
(2d ed. 1976); R. MUSGRAVE & P. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 610-
11 (st ed. 1973).
5. For a definition of cost spillovers, see text accompanying note 44 infra.
6. See text accompanying notes 10-37 infra.
7. See text accompanying notes 38-47 infra.
8. See text accompanying notes 48-115 infra.
9. See text accompanying notes 116-24 infra.
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effective device for separating Farmer's crops from Rancher's cattle.
The familiar Coase analysis suggests that if Farmer has no fights
against cattle damage, Farmer will pay Rancher to install the fence.10
This prediction, however, fails to take account of the possible involve-
ment of the public sector. If Farmer can readily influence his govern-
ment's officials, it may be cheaper for him to expend resources to
persuade them to use public funds to pay Rancher to build the fence.
More generally, regardless of the allocation of rights, Farmer might
attempt to persuade any organization over which he has influence to do
his bidding. In short, even in the simplest of conflicts there are an infi-
nite number of potential bargainers-including all governments.
A government thus can become involved in negotiations over a
spillover even when it has no fights and no duties. Realistically, gov-
ernments are more likely to be drawn into negotiations when they have
affirmative rights and obligations. The question thus arises: When
should a government have rights against (and duties toward) "foreign"
landowners and governments?
A. THE SMALL NUMBER CASE
When Rancher's cattle stray across a government boundary and eat
Farmer's crops, is it sensible to entitle Farmer's government to collect
damages from Rancher's government? Generally it would appear not.
When there are few private parties on both sides, deterrence and com-
pensation goals can be more cheaply and accurately achieved through
private property rights. To make governments concurrent owners of
rights and duties with their citizens would increase the number of par-
ties who would have to participate in even the simplest settlement ne-
gotiation, and thus add to transaction costs. For example, if Farmer
and Farmer's government concurrently owned the same right, Rancher
would always have to settle with both; if Farmer alone had affirmative
rights, Farmer's government would not necessarily have to become in-
volved in the resolution of the dispute. The creation of affirmative
rights and duties exclusively in Farmer's and Rancher's governments
would also be ill-advised. The goal of compensating Farmer would be
met only if Farmer's government passed on its recovery to him. Simi-
larly, the goal of deterring Rancher would be achieved only if
Rancher's government passed on its liabilities. Why go through the
expense of involving the shortstop and second baseman when a direct
throw from third to first will do the job? Moreover, because public
10. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
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officials may not act as profit maximizers, I the substance of an inter-
governmental settlement might not be as efficient as Farmer and
Rancher (the two most knowledgeable parties) would reach. In sum,
exclusively owned rights and obligations are administratively superior
to those that are concurrently owned and, in conflicts between a small
number of neighboring landowners, any affirmative rights and obliga-
tions are best vested in private parties.
B. THE LARGE NUMBER CASE
The optimal legal approach is less clear when the number of individu-
als involved in a spillover increases. This can happen in several ways:
the number of victims, emitters, or both may increase. The discussion
here will be restricted to the last of these variations; namely, large num-
bers of both victims and emitters. (Extensions of the analysis to small
versus large or large versus small number cases should be straightfor-
ward.)
1. Some Simplfying Assumptions
The introduction of this Article identified the four major policy options
available to a higher-level government when many private parties on
one side of a boundary separating two lower-level governments create
cost spillovers that injure a large number of private parties on the other
side. The higher-level government may: (1) directly regulate the activ-
ity (or activities) involved in the spillover; (2) administer grants-in-aid
or fines to internalize these spillover effects to lower-level governments;
(3) articulate a set of private property rights between injurers and vic-
tims that will reduce the transaction costs of those parties reaching a
bargained settlement of the conflict; and (4) articulate a set of public
property rights between lower-level governments to reduce the transac-
tion costs of those governments reaching a bargained settlement.
Any comparison of the merits of these four systems, especially the
latter two, threatens to become mired in extraneous detail. This Article
therefore adopts at the outset three simplifying assumptions that hold
constant some potentially varying, but unessential, features of both pri-
vate and public property rights systems.
First, I assume that under both systems the only remedies avail-
able to a victim are either time-to-time or permanent damages, i e., no
form of injunctive relief is ever granted.
11. See text accompanying notes 30-31 infra.
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In the next subsection,' ! the Article attempts to show the desirabil-
ity of there being two exclusive bargaining agents in large number
cases, one representing the victim group and the other representing the
emitter group. My second assumption is that when a public agent is
selected to represent victims, a public agent must also be chosen to rep-
resent emitters. The selection of governments to represent both sides
would produce what might be called a "pure" public property rights
system. The Article also discusses cases in which two private agents are
chosen, ie., a pure private property rights approach. The Article does
not discuss the other obvious, and perfectly viable, option--"mixed"
litigation involving a private representative on one side and a public
representative on the other.
The two exclusive bargaining agents may ultimately agree on a
monetary settlement, which according to my first assumption is the
only available judicial remedy. The issue then arises whether or not
the agents will pass on their recoveries and liabilities to individual
members of their groups. My third assumption is that private and pub-
lic property rights systems do not differ in this regard. Both systems are
assumed to follow an identical passing-on policy: both recoveries and
liabilities are passed on to individual group members,' 3 except where
the amounts at issue do not justify the administrative costs of arranging
the passthrough; recoveries not passed on to individual victims escheat
to some appropriate general-purpose government, whose identity does
not vary with the type of property rights system in use; liabilities not
passed on to individual emitters become the obligations of some other
appropriate general-purpose government.
2. Exclusive Bargaining Agents in Large Number Cases
a. Enforcing the rights of a large number of victims: When many
victims suffer damage from a common source, the legal system can ex-
pedite settlement of their claims by compelling all of them to use the
same exclusive bargaining agent.' 4 The desirability of a single bargain-
ing agent is clear when injunctive remedies are available and would be
12. See text accompanying notes 14-23 infra.
13. 1 do not wish to address in this Article the merits of various passing-on policies. Al-
though distributive considerations favor the passing on of both recoveries and liabilities, some
economists have argued that, in large number spillover situations, allocative efficiency is enhanced
if government recoveries are not passed on to actual victims. See, e.g., Baumol, On Taxation and
the Control of Externalities, 62 AM. ECON. REv. 307 (1972). In addition, passing-on inevitably
entails considerable administrative expense.
14. Cf. Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Organization, 420 U.S. 50
(1975) (National Labor Relations Act requires aggrieved minority employees to seek redress from
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enforceable by each victim. Strategic behavior by holdouts would then
be likely to derail settlements. For example, if individually entitled to
injunctive relief, any single Connecticut riparian could thwart a pro-
posed compromise solution to the Connecticut River pollution conflict.
At first glance, this holdout problem would appear to evaporate if
damages were made the exclusive remedy. Each individual plaintiff
might then be permitted to sever his right to a portion of the damages
from the group claim and to enforce it separately. If limited to recover-
ing damages, a single Connecticut riparian would appear not to have
the leverage necessary to disrupt a basin-wide settlement supported by
most of the involved parties. Several current legal practices reflect this
thinking: (1) individual claimants may sever their claims from class
actions; 5 (2) the 1976 Amendments to the Clayton Act, which author-
ize state attorneys general to bring parens patriae actions for antitrust
damages, also permit severance of individual claims; 16 and (3) private
victims of a public nuisance are entitled to recover individualized com-
pensation as long as their harms are "different in kind" from the public
harm. 17
Permitting the severance of individual damage claims initially ap-
pears to be warranted because an exclusive bargaining agent may
abuse its monopoly power and ignore minority interests. Holdouts re-
main a problem, however, even when damages are the only remedy, as
long as the legal system lacks mechanisms to internalize benefit spill-
overs. For example, suppose that the most cost-effective device for mit-
igating Connecticut River pollution would be an in-stream aeration
system constructed just below Springfield. This system would improve
water quality to well above the standard to which Connecticut ripari-
ans are legally entitled. If they could not recoup the future benefits of
the aeration system, the Springfield industrialists might agree to build
the system only if all Connecticut riparians agreed to waive their rights
to recover for past damages. In this situation, if an individual Connect-
icut riparian could sever his claim, each one would have an incentive to
hold out in an attempt to obtain both past damages and future above-
discriminatory employer practices through their union, and does not protect them from being fired
when they seek to bargain directly with employer).
15. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c).
16. 15 U.S.C. § 15c(b) (1976). For subsequent developments involving this statute, see note
65 infra.
17. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821C(l) (1979). See generally Bryson & Mac-




standard water. If there were no single class representative able to use
the waiver of all past damage claims as a bargaining chip, strategic
behavior might bar achievement of the most efficient settlement. Thus,
even when damages are the sole remedy, a legal system lacking
smoothly functioning benefit-internalization devices should as a rule
make a victim class speak with only one voice.' 8
There are two prime candidates for exclusive bargaining agent for
a victim class: (1) a private attorney (using class action procedures 19),
and (2) a government whose citizenry is relatively congruent with the
class of victims (using a parens patriae action20). Because it is desirable
to have but a single agent, only one of these two representatives should
be qualified to act in any specific conflict.
b. Designating an exclusive bargaining agentfor a large number of
emitters: Efficiency in resource allocation may also be enhanced if the
legal system identifies a single agent with authority to settle the liabili-
ties of a large number of joint tortfeasors. If damages are the exclusive
remedy, it is not inconceivable that the total group liability could be
split and exclusive portions assigned to each individual polluter; if this
were done, each could conceivably settle separately. Whenever a legal
system lacks adequate benefit-internalization systems, however, free-
loading can become a problem even when exclusive liabilities have
been carved out. Suppose, as before, that an in-stream aeration system
just below Springfield would be the most efficient way to reduce pollu-
tion in the Connecticut River. An exclusive bargaining agent repre-
senting the Springfield polluters could make a binding offer to build
such a treatment system as part of the settlement of the damage claim.
However, if individual polluters could sever their liabilities from the
group's, they might attempt to freeload on an aeration system financed
by the remainder of the group. Unless there was a mechanism for co-
ercing joint action, the efficient joint enterprise might never be orga-
nized.
18. For further discussion of this issue, see note 117 infra.
19. See generally Dam, Class. Actions: Efficiency, Compensation, Deterrence, and Conflict of
Interest, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 47 (1975); Note, The Cost-Internalization Casefor Class Actions, 21
STAN. L. REV. 383 (1969).
20. See generally Note, State Protection of its Economy and Environment: Parens Patriae
Suits/or Damages, 6 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 411 (1970). Some creative methods have been
suggested for combining public and private resources for enforcement (e.g., government subsidi-
zation of notice costs in private class actions). Developments in the Law-ClassActions, 89 HARV.
L. REV. 1318, 1642-44 (1976).
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The basic candidates for exclusive bargaining agent for defendants
are the same as the ones for plaintiffs. The legal system could permit
the designation of a single private attorney through class action proce-
dures, or could designate a government that contained all, or most, of
the emitters.
Having a government act as plaintiff for its citizens is not a novel
idea-witness parens patriae and public nuisance actions. There is
scant legal precedent, however, for the imposition on a government of
vicarious liability for an outflow of privately caused pollution. 2' Yet
such a rule often makes sense. The host government is a good "cost
avoider," to use Guido Calabresi's term, because its officials should
know that the pollution is occurring and can control it by regulating the
private emitters.22 An analogy may be drawn to the rule of respondeat
superior-an employer's vicarious liability for damages caused by em-
ployee misconduct. This ancient rule has persisted because, among
other reasons: (1) an employer can supervise his employees; and (2) an
injured party may have severe difficulty in identifying which of a firm's
employees misbehaved in a way that led to his injury. The same con-
siderations support a rule that might be called "respondeat patria"-a
government's vicarious liability for damages caused by cost spillovers
arising from a large number of private sources located within the gov-
ernment's boundaries.23
If established, this governmental liability should be exclusive (L e.,
not shared with the private polluters) in order to simplify settlement
negotiations.24 I have assumed, however, that the liable government
would pass on its liabilities to the private polluters-the "primary
wrongdoers" on whom indemnity law would usually ultimately fix the
loss-to the same extent that the liabilities would be passed on had a
private defendant class been organized.
21. See text accompanying notes 48-50, 66-68, 100-04 infra.
22. See G. CALABRESI, THE CosTs OF ACCIDENTS 135 n.1 (1970); Calabresi & Hirschoff,
Towarda Testfor Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1055, 1060 (1972) (losses should be borne
by the party "in the bestposition to make the cost-ben§1t analysis between accident costs and accident
avoidance costs and to act on that decision once it is made") (emphasis in original).
23. Other commentators who have endorsed this rule have also felt the urge to express it in
Latin. Professor Richard Stewart, who suggests it almost in passing, calls government liability for
private pollution the "reverse parenspatriae principle." Stewart, supra note 4, at 1247-49.
24. This is not a typical feature of vicarious liability; for example, a servant remains liable
for a tort for which his master is vicariously liable.
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3. Some Possible Adantages of Using Propery Rights Solutions in
Large Number Cases
Both public and private property rights are more decentralized than the
competing policy alternatives-regulatory and grant-in-aid programs
administered by a higher-level government. When either property
rights approach is used, the higher-level government (in our example
the federal government) must of course articulate the property rights
and provide institutions for their enforcement; but responsibility for in-
itiating enforcement is left to lower-level (subfederal) entities-namely,
private attorneys or state or local governments. Current federal anti-
pollution statutes generally adopt mandatory, nationally uniform envi-
ronmental standards. For example, Congress has asked the
Environmental Protection Agency to impose detailed air quality stan-
dards on Hawaii,25 even though that state is thousands of miles distant
from the other states and can only trivially affect those states' air quali-
ty. Critics have asserted that these federal environmental standards are
inefficient and impair the self-determination of subnational govern-
ments.26
These criticisms would be allayed if the federal standards were not
mandatory restrictions on private emitters, but rather defined property
rights (either public or private) enforceable either by neighboring states
or by class action. By decentralizing initiative for enforcement and set-
tlement, the two property rights solutions would better honor regional
variations in citizen tastes. In addition, the decentralized approaches
would lead to a wider range of environmental outcomes, thus generat-
ing more information on the merits of alternative environmental poli-
cies than is generated under a regime of uniform federal regulation.27
A federal grant-in-aid or penalty program aimed at redressing en-
vironmental spillovers would be somewhat less centralized than the
current federal environmental regulations. But even when a higher-
level government resorts only to monetary inducements, it still retains
sole responsibility for initiating enforcement. This monopoly on en-
forcement may possibly be exercised in a manner that abuses the inter-
25. See 40 C.F.R. § 52.620-.632 (1978) (Environmental Protection Agency finds Hawaii's air
quality plan inadequate in several respects).
26. B. ACKERMAN, S. ROSE-ACKERMAN, J. SAWYER & D. HENDERSON, THE UNCERTAIN
SEARCH FOR ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 317-30 (1974) (criticizing current federal water quality
programs) [hereinafter cited as THE UNCERTAIN SEARCH]; J. KRIER & E. URSIN, POLLUTION AND
POLICY 302-45 (1977) (criticizing current federal air quality programs).
27. See Peltzman & Tideman, Local versus NationalPollution Controk Note, 62 AM. ECON.
REV. 959 (1972).
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ests of minority factions that are contained within the higher-level
government. For example, if federal environmental officials were to
use monetary transfers to improve interstate water quality, they might
drag their feet if Massachusetts polluters had more clout in Washing-
ton, D.C., than did Connecticut riparians. 28 (Judicial review conceiva-
bly could root out biased enforcement policies; however, courts give
considerable deference to administrative decisions.) By contrast, if the
Connecticut landowners were represented by a private attorney, or by
the State of Connecticut, those agents would be less vulnerable to
counterpressures from Massachusetts polluters. As long as the federal
courts, presumably the proper forum for settling interstate disputes, are
more insulated from day-to-day political pressures than are federal ad-
ministrators, the rights and interests of Connecticut residents might be
more systematically protected if either of the property rights systems
were used. The current Federal Water Pollution Control Act in fact
makes Massachusetts the frontline enforcer of federal water quality
standards within Massachusetts' boundaries; 29 this is an odd approach
if the reason for federal involvement is the protection of out-of-state
residents.
4. Private Property Rights v. Public Property Rights in Large Number
Cases
What are the relative merits of the two property rights systems? The
question is empirical, and the data to answer it are not available. Nev-
ertheless, some a priori speculations can highlight probable differences
between the two systems.
a. The mystery of government behavior: In analyzing alternative
allocations of private rights and duties, most commentators assume that
private individuals are utility maximizers and that private firms are
managed to maximize the present value of the firm. More specifically,
these commentators assume that a private party will trade its rights
28. Internal federal politicking of this type was invited by the early federal air and water
quality statutes, which gave the United States Attorney General responsibility for bringing suit to
resolve interstate disputes. Water Pollution Control Act of 1948, § 2, Pub. L. No. 80-845, 62 Stat.
1156-57 (superceded by Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No.
92-500, § 103, 86 Stat. 818-19); Clean Air Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-206, § 5, 77 Stat. 396-99
(1963) (repealed by Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, § 114(b)(3), 84 Stat.
1688 (1970)).
29. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (Supp. 1977) (procedure under which states can assume respon-




whenever it will gain from the trade, and that, if it bears a risk of loss, it
will take all expense-justified measures to avoid that loss. These basic
assumptions of economics have, of course, not gone without challenge.
Nevertheless, they have shown considerable predictive power in a wide
range of contexts.
Although there is reason to suspect that public entities behave dif-
ferently than individuals or firms, what motivates public officials re-
mains obscure. If Connecticut were entitled to collect damages for an
inflow of pollution, one cannot be sure that state officials would treat
that right as a private party would treat the same right. Similarly, if
Massachusetts were liable for cost spillovers, one cannot be sure that its
officials would concern themselves with reducing the outflow that gave
rise to its liability.
For illustrative purposes, two models of government behavior that
have been discussed in the recent literature are set forth below. Neither
has yet shown sufficient predictive power to win the sort of backing that
economists have accorded their basic assumptions about the motiva-
tions of individuals and firms.
The model most conducive to the viability of the public property
rights approach predicts that government officials pursue the "public
interest."3 A government acting in the public interest would make all
Pareto-superior moves available to it and arguably might also adopt all
programs that have favorable benefit/cost ratios (regardless of their im-
mediate distributional consequences). Governments fitting this model
would vigorously enforce all public property rights, and could be ex-
pected to adopt efficient internal antipollution programs.3' The princi-
pal shortcoming of the public interest model is that it does not appear
to harmonize with the observed behavior of public officials, who often
seem attracted to programs of questionable efficiency and dubious eq-
uity.
A more cynical, but (to many) a more plausible, model is that
elected officials seek to maximize their chances of reelection, and that
nonelected officials (bureaucrats) seek to maximize the budgets of their
30. An impressive attempt to breathe life into this model is Michelman, Political Markets and
Community Se/Determination: Competing Judicial Models of Local Government Legitimacy, 53
IND. L.J. 145 (1977-1978).
3 1. In fact, a government pursuing the public interest might construe "public" broadly and
automatically consider cost spillovers when adopting policy; this version of the model would deny
the existence of the problem addressed in this Article.
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agencies.32 This second model generally does not respect public sector
performance, and thus might seem to favor private, as opposed to pub-
lic, representation of groups. For public property rights to be a viable
candidate as an internalization system, however, one need only assume
that financial impacts count to some extent in government decisions-
that is, if elected officials or bureaucrats can take an action that on
balance will result in an increase in the net assets of public treasuries or
citizen pocketbooks, they will regard that as a positive feature of the
action. This is hardly heroic. Surpluses in public treasuries would tend
to increase an incumbent's chances of reelection and give a tenured
bureaucrat a better chance of boosting next year's budget. Countless
other factors, however, affect election results and budget decisions.
Therefore, the cynical model would predict that "public" money means
less to a government official than "private" money does to an individ-
ual or firm. Nevertheless, there can be little doubt that federal grant-
in-aid programs have often led subfederal governments in the direction
that Congress wanted to entice them. This last bit of evidence is an
indication that public property rights could be a viable internalization
system.
If our understanding of government behavior were deeper it might
be possible to vary the structure of political units to induce officials to
give more heed to fiscal factors. For example, elected officials are apt
to have different incentives than appointed-and especially tenured-
officials. If so, how Connecticut would value and enforce rights against
polluters might depend upon whether enforcement was wholly admin-
istrative or whether it had to be ratified by legislative action. If Con-
necticut relied exclusively on administrators to enforce rights, it might
matter whether the state attorney general's office or the state environ-
mental protection agency had the authority to settle claims. Those two
agencies are apt to function in two quite different political environ-
ments.
b. The relative merits ofpublicproperty rights andprivate class liti-
gation: If it is assumed that public and private property rights incorpo-
rate identical passing-on policies, both will have similar distributional
consequences. The two systems may, however, differ in efficiency. "Ef-
32. See, e.g., W. NISKANEN, BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 38-42
(1971); Fiorina & Noll, Voters, Legislators and Bureacuracy. Institutional Design in the Public Sec-
tor, 68 AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS & PROC. 256 (1978); ef Note, An Economic Analysis of Sovereign




ficiency" has two aspects in this context. The first is allocative effi-
ciency-whether an internalization system induces polluters and
victims to install cost-effective pollution prevention devices. The sec-
ond is administrative efficiency-the cheapness of the claims settlement
process and of the passing-on of awards and liabilities. Allocative effi-
ciency and administrative efficiency frequently are at odds. We shall
see that, of the two property rights systems, private class litigation
seems likely to achieve greater allocative efficiency, and public property
rights, greater administrative efficiency.
(i) A locative efficiency: Private class representatives seem, a pri-
ori, more likely than public officials to be vigorous in asserting and
defending the interests of clients. Private attorneys should fit fairly
well the model of utility maximizers. Their clients will usually negoti-
ate fee arrangements that will spur plaintiffs' attorneys to maximize,
and defendants' attorneys to minimize, damage awards. By contrast,
the most plausible model of government behavior suggests that public
officials might not care much about settlement outcomes in some situa-
tions. For example, if a bureau representing a plaintiff government
were a budget maximizer, it might not vigorously pursue a claim unless
the bureau shared directly in the award. Thus, because vigorous repre-
sentation is necessary to the achievement of optimal settlements, pri-
vate class litigation seems more likely than public property rights to
lead to allocative efficiency.
Yet public property rights could conceivably be allocatively supe-
rior in some ways. Private class litigation inevitably immerses courts
deeply into the business of structuring classes and reviewing the sub-
stance of proposed settlements.33 Judges are widely regarded as being
poorly suited to this role in environmental cases34 because they lack
both adequate technical knowledge and sufficient staff support. A pub-
lic property rights approach would be less likely than private class liti-
gation to involve judges in orchestrating settlements because
specialized administrative agencies of the opposing governments could
frequently negotiate settlements without litigation. Nevertheless, on
balance, experience should tend to show that allocative efficiency con-
siderations favor the private class litigation device.
33. Judicial supervision is particularly necessary when most class members have only a small
interest in the outcome.
34. See sources cited in note 26 supra.
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(ii) Administrative efciency: In large number cases, public prop-
erty rights promise to be much cheaper to administer than private
property rights. Class actions require the establishment and judicial
supervision of "special governments" for the victim and emitter classes.
Because attorneys for plaintiffs in class actions are, in effect, self-ap-
pointed, the rules of civil procedure currently impose expensive proce-
dural safeguards on the use of the device. For example, the attorney
may have to notify class members that an action has been brought,
35
and courts may insist on carefully scrutinizing proposed settlements. 6
Public property rights, by contrast, are enforced by existing govern-
ment units. Officials of these governments are already under the disci-
pline of politics-a taskmaster not obviously inferior to trial court
judges, and probably far cheaper. In short, using an existing govern-
ment as a class representative should sharply reduce organization and
supervision costs. 37
Private class litigation may possibly be cheaper than intergoven-
mental litigation in some respects. The identification of group mem-
bers, a task necessary to the extent that passing-on is pursued, is
automatically accomplished when private classes are organized. Be-
cause trial judges would always approve specific passing-on formulas
in private cases, those formulas could not be the target of collateral
litigation, as they might be if set administratively. Finally, because pri-
vate classes more precisely comprehend actual emitters and victims,
private litigation can better remedy a conflict. For example, the
Springfield pollution might injure Massachusetts riparians as well as
those in Connecticut. These Massachusetts riparians could readily be
included in a private class of victims but would be left uncompensated
if Connecticut were the only plaintiff.
Nevertheless, because ad hoc governments are so expensive to or-
ganize, public property rights may on balance prove to have a signifi-
cant administrative edge on private class litigation. For certain types of
conflicts, this advantage in administrative efficiency conceivably could
outweigh the likely allocative superiority of private class litigation.
35. See, e.g., Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974); Home Say. & Loan Ass'n v.
Superior Court, 42 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 1012, 117 Cal. Rptr. 485, 488 (1974).
36. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e). But see Bernstein, Judicial Economy and Class Actions, 7 J.
LEGAL STUD. 349 (1978) (measured by judicial hours per dollar transferred, class actions are not
unusually burdensome).
37. Use of a public representative should be especially advantageous when the optimal rem-
edy is time-to-time, as opposed to permanent, damages because it would save the expense of
repeatedly organizing private classes.
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5. The Niche for Public Property Rights
Even if public property rights do prove to be more efficient than private
class litigation in some situations, intergovernmental litigation in those
same situations may remain inferior to the more centralized internal-
ization systems-namely, regulatory or penalty programs administered
by a higher-level government. If they are useful at all, public property
rights, ie., governmental entitlements against other governments,
would seem to be most promising when the following conditions are
met: (1) A readily identified flow of costs crosses a political boundary
(ie., all governments do not share a common condition that is the un-
decipherable joint product of emissions on all sides); (2) Large num-
bers of private parties create the flow, and large numbers of private
parties on the other side of the boundary feel its effects; and (3) A
small number of lower-level governments would rather accurately
represent both the private sources of the cost spillover, and the outsid-
ers who suffer those costs. All three conditions are met in the Connecti-
cut River example in which Connecticut could be granted an
entitlement (protected only by damages) to water of a certain quality
for Massachusetts. If public property rights are to work anywhere, they
should work in that type of case.
The third condition is quite restrictive. Many types of interjuris-
dictional spillovers affect many governments. For instance, factories
located in several states may combine to pollute a great interstate river
to the detriment of residents of several downstream states. In such a
situation, the large number of governments involved could make the
settlement of interstate claims so administratively expensive that public
property rights would be less efficient than a more centralized internal-
ization system.
II. SOME SUGGESTED RULES OF PUBLIC PROPERTY
Assume now a dispute that fits the niche-e., a controversy that in-
volves, on both sides, large numbers of private parties and potentially
small numbers of governments. What substantive rules of public prop-
erty might make sense?
A. CHOICE OF LAW
The sovereign whose rules are applicable to a conflict between two
lower-level governments could be selected in either of two ways. The
first way is to invoke choice-of-law principles (e.g., the "place of the
harm") to decide which lower-level government's domestic nuisance
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law applies.38 This approach seems ill-advised because a government
might skew its domestic law to help it in its external disputes. For ex-
ample, a state in a downstream location on several interstate rivers
would have an incentive to adopt excessively strict domestic nuisance
rules. The second possible source of applicable law is the government
at the next higher level whose boundaries encompass all parties to the
controversy. Because it is the most decentralized, yet neutral, source of
substantive rules, it seems the preferable choice.
B. SUBSTANTIVE RULES FOR RESOLVING INTERGOVERNMENTAL
DISPUTES
In spillover situations, efficiency is enhanced when pre-exchange rights
are defined to minimize the sum of (1) deadweight losses remaining
after all economically feasible exchanges, and (2) the costs of such ex-
changes (ie., transaction costs). 39 Generally speaking, this requires al-
location of risks of losses to the cheapest cost avoiders-namely, the
parties who have the best information about possible losses and how to
prevent them and the best ability to act on that information.40 In addi-
tion, legal rules can promote efficiency by making it easier for cheapest
cost avoiders to settle with their potential victims. Although there has
been lamentably little empirical work on how to do this, some consen-
sus hunches are that property rights should be clear (to reduce uncer-
tainty), exclusive (to obviate the organizational complexities that arise
from concurrent ownership), and transferable (to permit settlements).4'
These are guidelines for a higher-level government to follow in struc-
turing property rights among its lower-level units.
Borrowing heavily from my already published views on the opti-
mal structure of rights between private neighbors,42 1 will now summa-
rily suggest some substantive rules for public property rights. These
suggestions should be regarded as speculative because they rest on the
not unassailable assumption that the health of public treasuries matters
38. The traditional approach is to apply the local law of the state where the injury occurred,
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 147 (1971). This approach was followed in
Dallas v. Whitney, 118 W. Va. 106, 188 S.E.2d 766 (1936) (Ohio law applied in a suit involving
damages to an Ohio building allegedly caused by defendant's blasting in West Virgnia).
39. Michelman, supra note 30, at 179 n.l 11.
40. See generally G. CALABRESI, supra note 22; Calabresi & Hirschoff, suplra note 22.
41. For a more complete discussion of the desirability of these features, see R. POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 3.1, at 27-31 (2d ed. 1977).
42. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Convenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines as Land Use




The basic rule suggested is that transboundary losses caused by
privately engendered cost spillovers should prima facie be borne by the
emitting government, not the receiving government. Because spillover
effects tend to fan outward, more preventive technologies are usually
available at the emitting than at the receiving end. The emitting gov-
ernment is thus typically the cheaper cost avoider of the two because it
can better evaluate preventive technologies and better act on that anal-
ysis.
What standard should be used to determine whether a "cost spill-
over" has occurred between governments? An analogy to nuisance law
will prove instructive. Nuisance law does not entitle a private land-
owner to prevent his neighbors from doing everything he would prefer
them not to do, but only from conducting "subnormal" or "un-
neighborly" activities.' These are identified by a test of custom. What
is customary at a particular time and place cannot be a nuisance. Cus-
tomary behavior tends to be cost-justified behavior (especially when
transaction costs are low), because bargaining tends to eliminate ineffi-
cient practices. To grant a landowner rights to receive above normal
treatment would be inefficient because those rights would have to be
transferred to permit the efficient outcome of customary behavior. The
costs of those transfers are saved when there are no affirmative rights to
receive above normal treatment. I suggest a similar rule for public
property: a plaintiff government should not be entitled to be free from
all externally created pollution, but only from above normal levels of
pollution.
I assumed in Part 45 that a public property right is protected only
by a liability rule-i:e., that damages are the victim government's ex-
clusive remedy. This remedial approach is not inherent in public prop-
erty rights systems. Injunctive remedies are a possibility whenever
small numbers of governments are involved because holdout and free-
loader problems are then not severe. A court's injunctive decree might
order the government containing the emitters to reduce the pollution
outflow to a certain level by a given time. As often happens in school
desegregation cases, however, there might be foot-dragging by the de-
fendant government's officials, and thus the inevitable immersion of
43. See text following note 32 supra.
44. Reasons for placing liability only on subnormal behavior are more fully elaborated in
Ellickson, supra note 42, at 728-33.
45. See text accompanying notes 10-37 supra.
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judges into intrusive supervisory roles. The spirited debate over the
relative merits of injunctions and damages is far from over.46 In this
Article, I am proposing that damages be the exclusive remedy in public
property rights cases because this remedial restriction considerably
simplifies the present discussion, and is supported by my prior writings
on the remedy issue.47
The emitting government should only be prima facie liable for cost
spillovers. Its liabilities should be reduced to the extent that the vic-
tims' government was the cheapest cost avoider. This might occur
when the victims' government had failed to mitigate its citizens' dam-
ages, or when its citizens had suffered an unusual type of damage that it
should have known more about than the emitting government should
have.
To expedite settlements, public property rights should be exclusive
(Le., preempt all private remedies) and transferable; the procedures for
transfer should also be clearly defined.
C. WHICH GOVERNMENTS SHOULD HAVE RIGHTS AND DUTIES?:
THE RULE OF THE HIGHEST LEVEL
Courts and legislatures may have heretofore shied away from creating
vicarious public property rights because of the difficulty of designating
a particular government (or governments) to represent an aggrieved (or
cost-emitting) citizenry. The designations are sometimes straightfor-
ward, as when the emitters and their external victims are completely
separated by a single government boundary. But matters are rarely this
simple.
A first type of complication arises when the boundary crossed sep-
arates governments at several different levels. For example, a bound-
ary between two states is also a boundary between local governments
(e.g., counties) of those respective states. When should state or local
units represent the parties on either side? Two possible rules of deci-
sion come to mind. The first would confer the rights (or duties) in such
a situation on the most localized general purpose units of government,
provided that no more than a few governments at that level encom-
46. For a representative sampling of this debate, see Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 3, at
1115-23; Elliekson, spra note 42, at 738-48; Pollnsky, On the Choice Between Property Rules and
Liability Rules (forthcoming in ECONOMIC INQUIRY).
47. Simplification of the exposition is to be desired in part because there is yet another basic
remedial option: an injunction against emissions issued on condition that the victim(s) compen-
sate the emitter(s). See sources cited in note 46 supra.
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passed the affected private class. Suppose, to refer once more to our
example, that local government along the Connecticut River in Con-
necticut is highly balkanized. This rule would then grant affirmative
rights to Connecticut (not its political subdivisions) but Connecticut
would have these rights against the City of Springfield (which our ex-
ample stipulated as containing all of the private emitters). This ap-
proach best honors decentralized decisionmaking.
The alternative approach when a common boundary demarcating
several levels of government is crossed is to vest the affirmative rights
and duties exclusively in the highest-level governments on both sides.
In our example, these would be the States of Connecticut and Massa-
chusetts. This rule may implicate governments that appear to be larger
than necessary. Compared to its alternative, however, this rule (1) is
much easier to apply, (2) often involves fewer governments (and can
never involve more), and (3) by always designating governments of
equal stature to represent the two sides, may promote mutual respect
and thus enhance possibilities of settlement. This rule seems preferable
to the alternative in most situations. I call it the Rule of the Highest
Level.
A second type of complication arises when the same flow of spill-
overs crosses in sequence the boundaries of several different levels of
government. For example, suppose pollution from Springfield factories
injures not only Connecticut riparians, but also riparians in another
Massachusetts municipality, Agawam. It would be possible to entitle
both Connecticut and Agawam to vicarious public property rights. For
example, Connecticut might be given rights against Massachusetts
under federal law, and Agawam might be given rights against Spring-
field under Massachusetts law. However, a layer cake of public prop-
erty rights involving several different levels of government in a single
environmental dispute would greatly complicate settlement negotia-
tions. Springfield could hardly settle with Agawam, for example,
before knowing the impact Massachusetts' settlement with Connecticut
would have on Springfield polluters. This suggests that a Rule of the
Highest Level also be applied when several boundaries are crossed in
sequence. In those situations, public property rights should be created
solely at the highest level, where the involved governments will be least
numerous, and thus the transaction costs of settlements lowest. Under
this approach, Agawam should not have any rights because Spring-
field's spillovers have interstate impact. By restricting use of the public
property rights technique to the highest intergovernmental level af-
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fected, the Rule would in effect ask Massachusetts to handle its internal
water pollution problems through regulation or emission charges.
III. THE VICARIOUS RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF
NEIGHBORING GOVERNMENTS UNDER
CURRENT LAW
Whatever their merit, the rules just suggested can be used as a yardstick
for assessing current law. In general, the vicarious rights and duties of
neighboring governments are now quite poorly defined. To my knowl-
edge, no higher-level government has ever enacted detailed legislation
articulating such rights between its lower-level subdivisions. Judges
confronted with privately caused intergovernmental disputes therefore
have had to develop common law rules. Lacking legislative backing,
they have understandably been reluctant to develop public property
rights on their own. Perhaps as a result, there have been few reported
intergovernmental cases. This part will briefly review the thin body of
precedent at the international, interstate, and interlocal levels.
A. INTERNATIONAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
There has been only one significant instance of international litigation
over privately created cost spillovers. The Trail Smelter Arbitration
(United States v. Canada)4" involved noxious sulphur dioxide fumes
emitted from a private smelter located in British Columbia, Canada,
about seven miles from the United States border. The fumes had been
inflicting substantial damage to mostly private lands in the State of
Washington. The United States and Canada ratified a convention es-
tablishing an arbitration tribunal to resolve the dispute according to
principles of United States law. The tribunal eventually ordered Can-
ada to pay the United States a substantial sum for past damage in-
flicted, and also decreed prospective injunctive relief (which it seemed
to address directly to the corporation responsible for the pollution).
The literature does not indicate whether Canada obtained indemnifica-
tion from that corporation, or whether the United States distributed
any part of the award it received to the injured landowners; both of
these sets of private interests were involved in the negotiations, 49 how-
ever, so it is likely that these passthroughs occurred.
48. 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1905 (1941), reprinted in 33 AM. J. INT'L L. 182 (1939), 35 Am. J.
INT'L L. 684 (1941).
49. Hoffman, State Responsibility in International Law and Transboundary Pollution Injuries,




Several aspects of this remarkable case deserve emphasis. First,
the Trail Smelter decision adheres to the Rule of the Highest Level.
The proper parties were regarded as being the United States and Ca-
nada, not, for example, Washington and British Columbia.50 Second,
the tribunal came to the unprecedented conclusion that Canada was
vicariously liable in international law for the conduct of private pol-
luters located within its boundaries-a rule I have endorsed (but only
when there are multiple emitters) and termed "respondeat patria."
Third, the tribunal awarded damages-my recommended remedy in
intergovernmental litigation, but one rarely encountered in case law.
Fourth, although the decision did not say that the United States' rights
and Canada's duties were exclusive, it seems clear that all concerned
treated them as such.5'
The Trail Smelter decision grew out of a special United States-
Canada convention, and thus one should be wary of exaggerating its
importance. Nevertheless, some other international pollution disputes
have since been settled in accordance with the Trail Smelter principles.
For example, the United States has agreed to reduce the salinity of the
Colorado River at the Mexican border.52 Thus, international prece-
dents, sparse though they may be, appear to conform rather well to the
suggested rules.
B. INTERSTATE PROPERTY RIGHTS
Congress has never enacted a statute defining property rights between
neighboring states;" however, there is a body of judge-made interstate
50. The Rule seems to be honored generally in international law, where national govern-
ments usually bar their political subdivisions from making foreign policy. See, e.g., Zschering v.
Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968) (Oregon statute governing intestate distribution of personal property
unconstitutionally intrudes on federal powers over foreign affairs). See generally H. STEINER &
D. VAGTS, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS 160-76 (2d ed. 1976).
51. Read, supra note 49, at 223.
As the Trail Smelter involved only one private polluter, making that polluter (rather than
Canada) exclusively liable would have been a less circuitous approach; however, apparently no
Canadian court would take jurisdiction over a controversy involving injury to lands outside Ca-
nada, Holman, supra note 49, at 514-15, and probably no United States court had personal juris-
diction over the polluter.
52. Agreement on Colorado River Salinity, Nov. 16, 1970, United States-Mexico, 21 U.S.T.
2478, T.I.A.S. No. 6988.
53. Several recent federal antipollution statutes authorize any person to sue any other person
to prevent violations of the statute. See, eg., Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C.
§ 1365 (1976); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (Supp. 1977). These statutes thus conceivably
could provide a basis for suits between states. Cf. Township of Long Beach v. City of New York,
445 F. Supp. 1203 (D.N.J. 1978) (New Jersey township has right to enforce federal statute on
ocean pollution against New York municipality).
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law, primarily cases where one state has sued another for polluting or
diverting interstate waters. These cases adopt the sound rule that fed-
eral common law, not the law of a state identified through choice-of-
law rules, governs interstate disputes. 4 Interstate property law is clear
on little else.
1. Which Federal Court Has Trial Jurisdiction?
There is some uncertainty about which federal court would have juris-
diction to try an interstate case like Connecticut's potential lawsuit
against Massachusetts. A federal statute confers upon the Supreme
Court "original and exclusive jurisdiction" to try cases between one
state and another.55 Supreme Court Justices, however, have under-
standably been disinclined to spend their time acting as trial judges. In
any given interstate case, they may therefore decide that their original
jurisdiction is merely discretionary,56 and direct the parties to an ap-
propriate district court. 7 Yet, if the Connecticut Attorney General first
filed his complaint in a district court, the district judge might take the
federal statute at face value and conclude that only the Supreme Court
had jurisdiction to try the case.58 Not a promising start.
2. What Vicarious Rights Do States Have?
A more fundamental issue is whether federal common law currently
would entitle Connecticut to obtain redress against pollution originat-
ing in Massachusetts. The landmark case of Georgia v. Tennessee Cop-
per Co. 9 authorized a state to obtain injunctive relief on behalf of its
citizens against aprivate air polluter situated beyond state boundaries.
It is also well established that a state may obtain injunctive relief
against pollution arising out of an outside government's proprietary ac-
tivities.60
54. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 102 (1972); P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHA-
PIRO, & H. WECHSLER, HART & WECHSLER's THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
264-67 (2d ed. 1973). But see note 72 infra.
55. 28 U.S.C. § 1251 (a)(1) (1976). See also U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
56. See, e.g., Arizona v. New Mexico, 425 U.S. 794 (1976); Ohio v. Wyandotte Chems.
Corp., 401 U.S. 493 (1971).
57. See Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972).
The Court sometimes uses another ploy to avoid exercising its original jurisdiction: it may
hold that a state is actually suing to protect citizen interests, not its own sovereign interests. See,
e.g., Pennsylvania v. New Jersey, 426 U.S. 660 (1976).
58. See State Water Control Bd. v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm'n, 61 F.R.D. 588
(D.D.C. 1974).
59. 206 U.S. 230 (1907). See also Annot., 42 A.L.R. Fed. 23 (1979) (collection of authorities
on a state's standing to sue on behalf of its citizens).
60. See, e.g., Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972).
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These lines of cases fall far short of constituting an efficiency-en-
hancing system of interstate property rights. The first problem is that
the vicarious state rights established by these cases do not seem to be
exclusive. Some precedents would seem to entitle, for example, af-
fected local governments in Connecticut also to pursue their own
parens patriae actions to enjoin pollution emanating from out-of-state
governments. 6' Allowing both Connecticut and its subdivisions to sue
not only creates nonexclusive vicarious rights but also violates the Rule
of the Highest Level, which permits only states to participate as parties
in interstate disputes. In addition, the reported decisions do not indi-
cate whether the federal common law of interstate property rights
preempts private interstate claims. 62 Massachusetts can hardly be ex-
pected to settle with Connecticut if Connecticut may own its rights con-
currently with many others.
The second problem with these lines of cases is that courts have
been reluctant to use damages as a remedy. When a state without stat-
utory basis has sought to recover damages on behalf of its citizens from
a private defendant for antitrust violations,63 or water-polluting activi-
ties that have injured the environment,' most courts have held that the
state cannot be accorded that remedy. The rationale courts sometimes
give for this outcome is that a defendant would be subjected to double
liability if he had to satisfy the claims of both a state and its citizens.
This argument is not sound because double liability can be readily
avoided; either the state could be designated as a receiver for private
claimants residing within it (and their claims barred), or the state's re-
61. See Township of Long Beach v. City of New York, 445 F. Supp. 1203, 1213-14 (D.N.J.
1978) (New Jersey township may invoke federal common law governing interstate water pollution
in suit against New York municipality). But Sf New Jersey v. New York, 345 U.S. 369, 373 (1953)
(city is not permitted to intervene in suit when its state is already a party; "[a]n intervenor whose
state is already a party should have the burden of showing some compelling interest in his own
right, apart from his interest in a class with all other citizens and creatures of the state, which
interest is not properly represented by the state"). See also Township of River Vale v. Town of
Orangetown, 403 F.2d 684 (2d Cir. 1968) (New Jersey township has standing to attack New York
town's change of zoning for area near common boundary); Byram River v. Village of Port
Chester, 394 F. Supp. 618 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (Connecticut town, inter alia, may sue New York
village to stop its water pollution).
62. See note 61 supra.
63. See, e.g., Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of California, 405 U.S. 251 (1972); California v.
Frito-Lay, Inc., 474 F.2d 774 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973). But see Georgia v.
Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439 (1945); West Virginia v. Chas. Phizer & Co., 314 F. Supp. 710
(S.D.N.Y. 1970).
64. See, e.g., State v. Dickinson Cheese Co., 200 N.W.2d 59 (N. Dak. 1972); Commonwealth
v. Agway, Inc., 210 Pa. Super. Ct. 150, 232 A.2d 69 (1967). Butsee Maine v. M/V Tamano, 357 F.
Supp. 1097 (D. Me. 1973); Maryland v. Amerada Hess Corp., 350 F. Supp. 1060 (D. Md. 1972).
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covery could be restricted to amounts not recoverable by private liti-
gants. In other words, if the courts were careful to create exclusive
rights, they could start using damages as a remedy. In any event, a
state's vicarious rights to recover damages for citizen injuries are cur-
rently uncertain. This uncertainty could, of course, be rectified by stat-
ute.65
3. What Vicarious Duties Do States Owe Their Neighbors?
The third problem is that current federal common law sheds no light
on whether a state is vicariously liable for spillovers caused by private
polluters located within its boundaries. To date, a state has been held
responsible for impairing the quality of interstate waters only when the
impairment arose from its own proprietary activities,66 or from the pro-
prietary activities of its local governments. 67 In other words, interstate
common law has yet to incorporate the doctrine of "respondeat patria,"
which, through the Trail Smelter case, was incorporated into interna-
tional law several generations ago.68 Because state responsibilities for
private pollution are as yet undetermined, there are few clues about:
(1) how state duties would mesh with the duties of local governments
69
and with the duties of private firms also involved in the same cost spill-
65. In 1976, Congress did attempt to clarify states' rights but only in the antitrust context. 15
U.S.C. § 15c(b) (1976). The Supreme Court emasculated Congress' effort in Illinois Brick Co. v.
Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977), by holding that a state had to qualify as an "overcharged person"
under the Clayton Act to be entitled to pursue parens patriae antitrust remedies. Id at 733-34
n.14.
66. See, e.g., North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365 (1923) (Minnesota's ditches had
allegedly caused North Dakota flooding); Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S 46 (1907) (Colorado had
allegedly diverted water from the Arkansas River).
67. See, e.g., Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 94-97 (1972) (dictum); Missouri v.
Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 241-42 (1901) (Illinois is responsible for acts of the Sanitary District of
Chicago).
68. The Surpeme Court recently came close to facing the issue of state liability for private
pollution. Vermont invoked the court's original jurisdiction to bring an action against New York
and the International Paper Company arising out of the company's pollution of Lake Champlain
from the New York side. The parties agreed to settle, however, and the Court only had to decide
whether the settlement was appropriate. See Vermont v. New York, 417 U.S. 270 (1974) (refusing
to approve special master's report recommending proposed settlement).
69. The Supreme Court has permitted a state to bring a direct action against the municipal-
ity of another state to remedy the latter's proprietary pollution. See New Jersey v. City of New
York, 283 U.S. 473 (1931). This approach does not violate the Rule of the Highest Level because
the pollutants are not arising from multiple sources.
In cases of this type, the Court will apparently give the plaintiff state the option of suing just
the city, see Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 97-98 (1972), or both the city and the state,
see New Jersey v. New York, 345 U.S. 369, 374-75 (1953). There are no reported cases in which
the victim state sued just the state of the polluting city.
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overs, and (2) what remedies would be available if a state breached its
duty to control private pollution.
4. What Cost Spillovers Are Actionable?
The substantive standards the federal courts currently apply in inter-
state environmental disputes are about as clear as one can expect in
common law adjudication. Federal judges generally impose sanctions
only against above normal levels of pollution. In this regard, the fed-
eral common law parallels the rules proposed in this Article. For ex-
ample, in 1900 the Sanitary District of Chicago reversed the flow of the
Chicago River so that it emptied into the Mississippi River basin rather
than into Lake Michigan. Missouri residents immediately began to
complain of unhealthful sewage in the Mississippi. Writing for the
Supreme Court in the resulting litigation, Missouri v. Illinois,7 ° Justice
Holmes confronted the question of what Missouri's rights were:
If we are to judge by what [Missouri] itself permits, the discharge of
sewage into the Mississippi by cities and towns is to be ex-
pected .... [Slome consideration is given to the practical course of
events. In the black country of England parties would not be ex-
pected to stand upon extreme rights.7'
He concluded that the evidence, as presented, did not entitle Missouri
to relief.
72
The complexity of pollution problems makes it hard for courts and
litigants to determine what "normal" levels are. In the future, federal
judges could increase the clarity of the federal common law by apply-
ing the traditional tort doctrine that statutes and regulations are evi-
dence of the standard of care. This would permit federal judges to use
federal antipollution regulations to help define the quality of incoming
water and air to which a state is vicariously entitled.73
5. Constitutional Constraints
Two unsung clauses of the federal constitution might possibly impede
adoption of an interstate property rights system.
First, a long line of Supreme Court cases holds that the eleventh
70. 200 U.S. 496 (1906).
71. Id at 521-22.
72. But see Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 107-08 (1972):
[A] State with high water-quality standards may well ask that its strict standards be
honored and that it not be compelled to lower itself to the more degrading standards of a
neighbor. There are no fixed rules that govern; these will be equity suits in which the
informed judgment of the chancellor will largely govern.
73. See also note 53 supra.
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amendment 74 permits a state to seek damages from another state only
when the plaintiff state is striving to protect its sovereign interests. 5
Therefore, federal judges might interpret the eleventh amendment to
bar their awarding Connecticut damages against Massachusetts, partic-
ularly if they thought Connecticut residents would have viable damage
claims under private nuisance law. This poses a problem if, as I have
argued, damages is the preferable remedy in interstate litigation.
Second, the compact clause76 threatens to increase greatly the
transaction costs of some kinds of interstate settlements. An interstate
agreement to which the compact clause applies is not binding without
congressional approval. The Supreme Court has interpreted the com-
pact clause to apply only to interstate agreements that enhance state
power to the detriment of federal supremacy. 77 This standard is suffi-
ciently ambiguous to cast a cloud of uncertainty over many interstate
agreements. For example, Connecticut and Massachusetts might wish
to set up an arbitration system or some other administrative apparatus
for resolving their future water quality disputes. If Congress had not
approved their system, a party aggrieved by its operation could chal-
lenge the system as violating the compact clause. Although this chal-
lenge would probably not succeed,78 it still might delay use of the
system for several years.
To forestall this type *of litigation, the two states might seek con-
gressional approval of their joint agreement. That avenue, however, is
certain to result in other frustrations. Recently, state negotiation and
congressional ratification of an interstate compact have together taken
an average of eight years.79 Congress has contributed to this glacial
74. The eleventh amendment provides: "The Judicial power of the United States shall not
be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S.
CONsT. amend. XI.
75. See, e.g., North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365, 374-75 (1923); New Hampshire v.
Louisiana, 108 U.S. 76 (1883).
76. Article I of the United States Constitution provides: "No State shall, without the Con-
sent of Congress. . .enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign
Power .. " U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
77. United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm'n, 434 U.S. 452 (1978). See generally
Engdahl, Characterization of Interstate Agreements: Mhen Is a Compact Not a Compact?, 64
MICH. L. REV. 63 (1965).
78. See United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm'n, 434 U.S. 452 (1978).
79. 2 F. GRAD, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 7.01[21, at 7-5 to -7 (2d ed. 1978).
A review of interstate water pollution compacts may be found in I F. GRAD, supra,
§ 2.03[5][b], at 2-358 to -369. For an insightful analysis of the results of the compact that created
the Delaware River Basin Commission, see THE UNCERTAIN SEARCH, supra note 26.
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pace by declining to rubberstamp interstate agreements, and instead
insisting on undertaking its own review of the merits of each agree-
ment. For example, in the late 1960's when it was in the process of
amending the Clean Air Act, Congress refused to approve several inter-
state air pollution compacts pending before Congress. 80 As long as
congressional approval is needed (or even arguably needed), the prop-
erty rights of states can be transferred only with great difficulty. Ready
transferability is, of course, an essential attribute of a viable property
rights system.
6. .4 Possible Statutory Definition of Vicarious Interstate Property
Rights
Commentators are correct in observing that in the past, states have had
great difficulty using compacts to implement efficient programs to com-
bat regional air and water pollution.8 ' But this history of failure does
not conclusively prove the futility of the public property rights tech-
nique of internalizing intergovernmental spillovers. It only supports
some old hunches: that bargaining is difficult when rights and duties
are unclear, concurrently owned, and hard to transfer. In light of the
multitude of current legal problems, it should hardly be surprising that
Connecticut and Massachusetts would have trouble negotiating an
agreement that would efficiently remedy the pollution of the Connecti-
cut River."2
Even if reformulated, interstate property rights can at best play
only a rather limited role in the pollution context. Many pollutants can
travel hundreds of miles, e.g., D.D.T. in the water or sulfates in the air.
In addition, for some types of pollution sources (like automobile emis-
sions), national regulation may enable achievement of significant econ-
omies of scale. Decentralized regulation of these aspects of
environmental problems holds little promise. On the other hand, many
environmental conditions are relatively localized-e.g., concentrations
80. E.g., Illinois-Indiana Air Pollution Control Compact, IND. CODE ANN. §§ 13-5-7-1 to -4
(Bums 1973) (repealed 1977); Mid-Atlantic States Air Pollution Control Compact, N.Y. ENVIR.
CONSERV. LAW §§ 21-1501 to -1513 (McKinney 1973). See 1 F. GRAD, supra note 79, § 3.03[51, at
3-312 to -314; Zimmerman, Political Boundaries andAir Pollution Control, 46 J. URB. L. 173, 186-
88, 191-97 (1969).
81. See THE UNCERTAIN SEARCH, supra note 26, passim; Green, State Control afInterstate
Air Pollution, 33 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 315, 323-30 (1968); Zerbe, supra note 4, at 226-27, 242-43.
82. In fact, both states are members of the multistate New England Interstate Water Pollu-
tion Control Compact. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 25-67 to -68a (West 1975); MASs. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 21 app., §§ 1-1 to -5 (West 1973). This Compact created a commission and authorized it
to adopt water quality standards, which the member states are to enforce within their own bound-
aries. The commission itself lacks enforcement powers.
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of particulates in the air or shortages of dissolved oxygen in the water.
Federal specification of a state's vicarious rights to receive a certain
quality of air and water in these respects might prove to be more effi-
cient than the current federal statutes that set nationally uniform
mandatory standards.
Most experts believe, and the current federal common law indi-
cates, that interstate environmental disputes are poorly suited to judi-
cial resolution.83 In addition, the Supreme Court has hinted that it
would welcome a statutory recasting of the federal common law of in-
terstate relations. 4 The contours of such a statute are easy to draw.
Invoking its powers under the commerce clause,85 Congress could es-
tablish a specialized agency called the Board on Interstate Environ-
mental Disputes. The Board would be delegated two major
responsibilities. First, it would be asked to specify substantive stan-
dards for levels of interstate spillovers that are of the type susceptible to
decentralized adjustment. These standards would then define the vica-
rious rights and duties of neighboring states. To make them exclusive,
Congress should indicate that these standards, which obviously could
be considerably more specific than general nuisance principles, would
preempt the federal common law86 and all other transboundary public
and private property rights. Second, the Board would be given primary
jurisdiction to adjudicate a dispute between states when the violation of
Board standards was at issue. Board rulings would be appealable to
the federal circuit court of appeals for the region in question, and there-
after to the Supreme Court.87
Although a federal statute cannot sweep away constitutionally de-
rived impediments to public property rights, the Supreme Court does
give congressional enactments deference when it engages in constitu-
83. THE UNCERTAIN SEARCH, supra note 26, at 219-20; KRIER & URSIN, supra note 26, at
33-34.
84. See Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 107 (1972) (implying federal statute may
someday preempt federal common law of nuisance); Ohio v. Wyandotte Chems. Corp., 401 U.S.
493 (1971) (interstate pollution cases are currently awkward for the Court to manage).
85. The commerce clause empowers Congress to create interstate property rights. United
States v. Bishop Processing Co., 287 F. Supp. 624 (D. Md. 1968). See also Stewart, supra note 4, at
1228, 1248.
86. Cf. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 47 U.S.L.W. 2716 (7th Cir. 1979) (Federal Water Pol-
lution Control Act of 1972 does not preempt federal common law remedies); People v. City of
Milwaukee, 366 F. Supp. 298 (N.D. Ill. 1973) (same).
87. For more detailed suggestions on the structuring of intergovernmental rights, see text
accompanying notes 39-47 supra.
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tional interpretation. 8 Some scholars have concluded that the eleventh
amendment only restrains judicial initiatives;8 9 if this interpretation is
correct, Congress by statute could readily establish damages as the
usual remedy in interstate environmental disputes. The compact
clause, perhaps, is not so easily rendered innocuous. That clause, how-
ever, has been construed as being designed to prevent states from in-
creasing their power to the detriment of federal supremacy; therefore,
were Congress and the President to declare (by statute) that they do not
want to review certain types of agreements between states, the federal
courts would probably defer to the congressional and Presidential con-
clusion that federal supremacy interests were not in jeopardy.
C. INTERLOCAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
A fresh hypothetical will facilitate analysis of possible rights and duties
of local governments. Suppose that the City of Los Angeles zones for
industrial use a multiblock area adjacent to the City of Beverly Hills.
The several dozen business firms that own land in the multiblock area
subsequently develop their individual parcels, creating a major indus-
trial complex on the Los Angeles site. This complex generates noise,
traffic congestion, and aesthetic blight, which annoy Beverly Hills resi-
dents whose houses lie just across the common municipal boundary.
Like the Connecticut River example, this hypothetical involves large
numbers of private parties on both sides of the conflict.
Policy analysts usually recommend that intermunicipal spillovers
of this type be internalized through a shift of regulatory responsibility
to a higher-level government. Thus, article 7 of the Model Land De-
velopment Code uses the term "development of regional impact" for
land uses that have pervasive effects, and suggests that state govern-
ments issue rules to govern their location.90 Article 7 does not author-
ize neighboring municipalities to agree to an adjustment of the state
rules on development of regional impact when officials of all affected
cities conclude that their constituents would gain from such an adjust-
ment. The Code thus ignores the possible role of public property rights
and may therefore recommend an unnecessarily centralized ap-
88. See generally Cox, The Role of Congress in Constitutional Determinations, 40 U. CIN. L.
REV. 199 (1971).
89. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 3-37, at 139-43 (1978). See also Field,
The Eleventh Amendment and Other Sovereign Immunity Doctrines: Congressional Imposition of
Suit Upon the States, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 1203 (1978).
90. MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE §§ 7-101 to -504, accompanying notes, commentary
on art. 7 at 248-54 (1976). The Code delegates to local governments, under threat of state review,
the responsibility for enforcing these.state rules. Id § 7-204.
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proach.9t
1. The Current Case Law of Zntermunicipal Rights
A few intermunicipal lawsuits have grown out of disputes like the hy-
pothetical one between Beverly Hills and Los Angeles. These cases
have perplexed the courts. Thus, the case law of interlocal property
rights is now terribly confused. The only solidly established rule is that
disputes between a state's local governments are to be resolved accord-
hag to the law of that state rather than federal law or local ordinance.92
a. Does a municipality have vicarious rights against its neighbors?:
Borough of Cresskill v. Borough of Dumont93 is the leading case holding
that a municipality must consider the interests of outsiders when it
zones land situated near its boundary. In that case, the New Jersey
Supreme Court also had an opportunity to decide to whom this munici-
pal duty ran. The plaintiffs included both neighboring boroughs and
private parties who owned land just beyond the defendant borough's
boundary. The court concluded that the outside landowners had stand-
ing to enforce the defendant's regional obligations; it therefore did not
reach the issue of whether the neighboring governments also had stand-
hag. Since Borough of Cresskill, state courts have rather consistently
granted private outsiders standing to challenge the rezoning of border
areas,94 but more often than not have refused to confer standing on
outside governments.95
91. Observe also that the Code overlooks the possible role of state-administered grants-in-
aid or penalties in disciplining municipal handling of development of regional impact.
92. Committee for Jones Falls Sewage Sys. v. Train, 539 F.2d 1006 (4th Cir. 1976); City of
Inglewood v. City of Los Angeles, 451 F.2d 948 (9th Cir. 1972); City of Boston v. Massachusetts
Port Auth., 320 F. Supp. 1317 (D. Mass. 1971).
93. 15 N.J. 238, 104 A.2d 441 (1954).
94. See, e.g., Scott v. City of Indian Wells, 6 Cal. 3d 541, 492 P.2d 1137, 99 Cal. Rptr. 745
(1972); Allen v. Coffel, 488 S.W.2d 671 (Mo. App. 1972).
95. See Annot., 49 A.L.R.3d 1126 (1973) (collection of conflicting cases).
The trend in recent cases favors government standing. See, e.g., Forestview Homeowners
Ass'n v. County of Cook, 18 Ill. App. 3d 230, 309 N.E.2d 763 (1974); Borough of Roselle Park v.
Township of Union, 113 NJ. Super. 87, 272 A.2d 762 (1970); Town of Bedford v. Village of
Mount Kisco, 33 N.Y.2d 178, 306 N.E.2d 155, 351 N.Y.S.2d 129 (1973). But see Town of North
Hempstead v. Village of North Hills, 38 N.Y.2d 334, 342 N.E.2d 566, 379 N.Y.S.2d 792 (1975)
(statute construed to deny a town standing to challenge zoning ordinances).
Interlocal litigation has erupted over conflicts other than the rezoning of border areas. In
some of these instances, the defendant has failed to raise the issue of standing, and the courts have
reached the merits of the case. See, e.g., City of Carmel-By-the-Sea v. Monterey County Bd. of
Supervisors, 70 Cal. App. 3d 84, 139 Cal. Rptr. 214 (1977) (city challenges county's handling of
environmental impact report); Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-By-the-Sea, 61 N.J.
296, 294 A.2d 47 (1972) (city and two of its residents challenge neighboring city's beach use fees).
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The refusal of most state courts to create vicarious municipal
rights stands in contrast with the willingness of the federal courts to
hear parens patriae suits brought by states. The state court position is
difficult to fathom. If the state courts are willing to allow a multitude
of outside landowners to obtain injunctive relief against a municipal-
ity's breach of its regional obligations, bargaining over settlements will
be plagued by a large number of parties. Adding outside governments
to the list of potential plaintiffs would not substantially complicate mat-
ters. In fact, entitling governments to sue may reduce the costs of or-
ganizing a plaintiff class. Alternatively, if damages are to be the
exclusive sanction against municipal wrongdoing, and many private
owners of external land have been harmed, public property rights may
be the most efficient internalization system.96
On the other hand, the reluctance of state court judges to create
vicarious intermunicipal rights fits into a larger pattern. The common
law of intergovernmental property rights is now best defined at the in-
ternational level (if one believes the precedential value of the Trail
Smelter decision97), and worst defined at the interlocal level. It seems
that the weaker the legislative authority at a given governmental level,
the more likely judges at that level are to act on their own to create
public property rights. In other words, courts have been more likely to
take the initiative to coordinate intergovernmental relations when no
other institution could. Because state governments have plenary power
(unlike the United States and the United Nations, both of which have
limited powers), state court judges may understandably be more reluc-
tant than judges on "higher" courts to create intergovernmental prop-
erty rights.
b. Remedies for interlocal conflicts: Because courts normally use
injunctive remedies in land-use cases,98 they can be expected to resort
to this same remedy whenever they do venture to recognize in-
termunicipal rights. I have argued elsewhere that the remedy of dam-
The results have been mixed, however, when the defendant government has contested the plaintiff
city's standing. See, e.g., City of Davis v. Coleman, 521 F.2d 661 (9th Cir. 1975) (city has standing
to challenge federal Department of Transportation's failure to prepare federal and state environ-
mental impact reports); City of Inglewood v. City of Los Angeles, 451 F.2d 948 (9th Cir. 1972)
(city has standing to attack airport noise); City of Hartford v. Towns of Glastonbury, 561 F.2d
1032 (2d Cir. 1976) (en banc) (city lacks standing to attack federal disbursement of special revenue
sharing funds to city's suburbs).
96. See text accompanying notes 30-37 supra.
97. See notes 48-52 and accompanying text supra.
98. See, e.g., cases cited in note 105 infra.
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ages is more accurate and less intrusive in most land-use cases. 99 To
the extent that courts and legislatures do create any type of in-
termunicipal rights, they should ordinarily enforce these rights exclu-
sively with damages.
c. 4 municipality's vicarious liabilities: Under current law, munic-
ipalities are rarely held liable for failing to control their residents. For
example, a local government is not vicariously liable at common law
for failing to abate a private nuisance whose source lies within its bor-
ders.1°° Illustrative is Breiner v. C & P Home Builders, Inc.,l0' where a
borough was held to owe no duty to persons whose lands outside the
borough were flooded as a result of private improvements located in
borough subdivisions. This municipal immunity from liability is de-
fensible when the nuisance arises, as it did in Breiner, from only one or
a few private sources, because those sources can themselves be held
responsible.' ° As explained above, however, there is a strong case for
holding a government vicariously liable under a rule of "respondeat
patria" when many of its residents contribute to a common flow of cost
spillovers.10 3 State courts may of course be justified in leaving the crea-
tion of a "respondeat patria" rule to their legislatures. There is at least
one forerunner of legislation of this type: the Mob Violence Statutes,
through which some states make a municipality liable for having failed
to control a riot that municipal officials knew (or should have known)
99. Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 86 YALE L.J.
385, 490-93 (1977).
I have not found a case where a municipality was awarded damages for cost spillovers arising
from a neighboring municipality but judges do not seem completely hostile to the idea. See City
of Inglewood v. City of Los Angeles, 451 F.2d 948 (9th Cir. 1972) (district court wrongly dismissed
plaintiff city's action to recover damages occasioned by noise emanating from defendant city's
airport); Township of River Vale v. Town of Orangetown, 403 F.2d 684 (2d Cir. 1968) (New
Jersey township's complaint seeking damages and injunctive relief against New York town that
rezoned area near their common boundary stated cause of action); Valley County v. Thomas, 109
Mont. 345, 97 P.2d 345 (1939) (County A should be entitled to obtain damages from County B if
evidence shows that County B wrongly licensed automobiles otherwise taxable by County A).
100. See, e.g., James' Adm'r v. Trustees of Harrodsburg, 85 Ky. 191, 3 S.W. 135 (1887) (city is
not liable for failing to suppress private blasting that led to plaintiff's injury); Ricketts v. Alle-
gheny County, 409 Pa. 300, 186 A.2d 249 (1962) (county is not liable to trespassing minor injured
in abandoned private building). But see Hansen v. City of St. Paul, 298 Minn. 205, 214 N.W.2d
346 (1974) (city is liable for damages when domestic dogs, known by the city to be roaming the
streets, bit plaintiff); cf. State v. Corporation of Shelbyville, 36 Tenn. 112, 4 Sneed 176 (1856)
(state can indict municipality for public nuisance when municipality allows operation of private
slaughterhouse).
101. 536 F.2d 27 (3rd Cir. 1976).
102. See text accompanying notes 10-11 supra.




d. Measuring municipal duties.- the shortcomings of the "regional
welfare" test: Several leading state supreme courts have recently held
in cases brought by private plaintiffs that local governments must con-
sider the regional welfare when making land-use policy.105 These state
supreme courts examined the total effects of a local policy, i e., its costs
and benefits, both internal and external. A court adopting a regional
welfare test in its most extreme form would deem a local policy that
injures outsiders invalid whenever the policy's total costs exceeded its
total benefits. 106
Such a judicial doctrine forces a suburb to give some account to
the cost spillovers that might arise from its affirmative policies. For
several reasons, however, this legal approach does a poor job of struc-
turing property rights. First, cases of this type entitle a multitude of
private parties to enforce a municipality's regional obligations by in-
junction. These decisions thus not only fail to create exclusive rights,
but also provide the wrong remedy-namely, injunctions in large-
number cases. Second, because they insist on granting injunctive relief,
these courts are forced to employ an efficiency calculus (the regional
welfare test) to measure a municipality's regional obligations; the
calculus is made necessary to ensure that the benefits of injunctive re-
lief outweigh its costs.'0 7
By contrast, if the state supreme courts were to enforce regional
104. See Annot., 26 A.L.R.3d 1142, 1198 (1969); Note, Municipal Liabilityfor Riot Damage,
81 HARV. L. REv. 653 (1968).
105. See, e.g., Associated Home Builders of the Greater Eastbay, Inc. v. City of Livermore, 18
Cal. 3d 582, 557 P.2d 473, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1976); Southern Burlington County NAACP v.
Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713 (1975); Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 38
N.Y.2d 102, 341 N.E.2d 236, 378 N.Y.S.2d 672 (1975). In these cases, the local governments were
not being sued vicariously on the basis of their citizens' misconduct but rather directly for their
own official actions.
The Supreme Court has not provided any constitutional base for the federal common law the
Court has developed to govern interstate relations. Congress therefore could readily change inter-
state property rights by statute. The state court cases just cited, however, ground a municipality's
regional obligations on constitutional doctrine, not common law principles. A state statute chang-
ing intermunicipal property rights could thus potentially be vulnerable to constitutional attack.
106. The case that comes closest to adopting this rule is Borough of Allendale v. Township
Comm. of Township of Mahwah, 169 NJ. Super. 34, 404 A.2d 50 (1979). See also Town of
Bedford v. Village of Mount Kisco, 33 N.Y.2d 178, 189-92, 306 N.E.2d 155, 160-62, 351 N.Y.S. 2d
129, 137-39 (1973) (Breitel, J., dissenting) (local ordinance does not deserve presumption of valid-
ity when it is attacked by neighboring town).
107. The extreme version of the regional welfare test requires a cost-benefit analysis of the
type used in the Learned Hand test for negligence. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159
F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947). See generally Calabresi & Hirschoff, supra note 22.
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obligations only through damages, they would not have to do a cost-
benefit analysis of a local policy but could impose strict liability when-
ever a municipality (or its citizens) caused cost spillovers. Actionable
spillovers would be defined as cost-engendering departures from nor-
mal land usage (as in nuisance law). Strict liability tests are generally
easier to administer than negligence tests. For example, an adjudicator
could more easily decide whether a Los Angeles industrial complex
was a below-normal neighbor for Beverly Hills than it could decide
whether, from a regional standpoint, the Los Angeles site was an ineffi-
cient location for industry. In sum, because the state supreme courts
have opted for the wrong remedy (ie., injunctions), they have been
forced to use an undesirable substantive standard for identifying ac-
tionable cost spillovers.
This analysis suggests that a better set of rules to constrain a mu-
nicipality's parochial land-use policies would: (1) create exclusive
rights defined by a normal land-usage standard; (2) enforce those
rights only with damages; and (3) designate exclusive bargaining agents
whenever there are large numbers of rightholders. Whether these bar-
gaining agents should be neighboring governments or private attorneys
would turn on considerations of allocative and administrative effi-
ciency. °8 It is conceivable that an optimal plaintiff to challenge a sub-
urb's exclusionary zoning. is the central city of the relevant
metropolitan area.
2. The Creation of Interlocal Rights by Statute
Although they are clearly the best institutions to undertake the job,
state legislatures have rarely articulated affirmative intermunicipal
property rights of any kind. There have been a few exceptions. A re-
markable Illinois statute once provided that if a pauper moved from
Town A to Town B, Town B could recover from Town A any reason-
able expenditures made to support the pauper."°9 The Michigan Envi-
ronmental Protection Act"0 authorizes any party (including political
subdivisions) to sue any other party (including political subdivisions) to
obtain declaratory or equitable relief against pollution or impairment
of natural resources. At least three of the first 119 cases in which this
108. See text accompanying notes 30-37 supra.
109. The statute, repealed long ago, is described in Town of Elm Grove v. Town of Pekin, 305
Ill. App. 80, 26 N.E.2d 995 (1940).
110. MIcHs. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 691.1201-.1207 (West Supp. 1978). See also Minnesota
Environmental Rights Act, MINN. STAT. §§ 116B.01-.13 (1977). Both are discussed in Bryden,
EnvironmentalRights in Theory and Practice, 62 MINN. L. RE. 163 (1978).
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statute was invoked were actions between local governments." 'I Michi-
gan's intermunicipal property rights, however, appear to be little more
than an incidental byproduct of an ambitious piece of environmental
legislation. Note also that the Michigan act unfortunately creates uni-
versally owned environmental rights, and neither authorizes the award
of damages nor establishes the rule of "respondeat patria." It is thus
not a promising model for public property rights legislation." 2
A city in the position of Beverly Hills is thus currently unlikely to
have any vicarious rights against Los Angeles under statutory or com-
mon law. The California legislature could of course readily alter this
situation. The present analysis suggests the possible utility of a statute
making Los Angeles strictly liable to Beverly Hills for pervasive dam-
ages caused by the cumulative impact of multiple subnormal private
land uses in Los Angeles. If created, these rights and duties should be
exclusive-that is, should supplant all affirmative transboundary pri-
vate property rights. A body such as the State Land Planning Agency
envisioned in the Model Land Development Code" 3 could be dele-
gated the tasks of specifying these intermunicipal rights, and trying
cases where they are at issue.
3. The Limited Potential of Interlocal Property Rights
In general, public property rights will probably prove to be less useful
as an internalization device at the interlocal level than at the interstate
Ill. See Hayes, Michigan Environmental Protection Act in Its Sixth Year, 53 J. URB. L. 589,
685 (1976).
112. A few state statutes have created interlocal procedural rights such as the right of a mu-
nicipality to receive notice that a neighboring municipality is considering approving land-use
changes near their common border. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 66453 (West Cum. Supp. 1978)
(processing municipality must give neighboring municipality a chance to make recommendations
on subdivisions proposed in area near common boundary); id § 65305 (similar procedure for
changes in "general plan").
Twenty states have statutes authorizing municipalities to exercise extraterritorial zoning, and
32 states authorize municipalities to approve subdivisions near, but outside, municipal bounda-
ries. D. MANDELKER & D. NETscH, STATE AND LocAL GOVERNMENT IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM
446-48 (1977). Ordinances passed to implement statutes of this type can create significant munici-
pal rights against outsiders. For example, Beverly Hills' plight would be eased if it could prohibit
industrial uses in nearby Los Angeles. Current statutes, however, only grant cities extraterritorial
powers over unincorporated lands, and thus do not affect intermunicipal relationships.
A state could of course authorize its municipalities to veto any land use project no further
than, say, one mile from municipal borders. But this response to the phenomenon of cost spill-
overs would be ill-advised. The simultaneous regulation of border lands by two or more govern-
ments would create nonexclusive rights and add greatly to the red tape involved in land
development. If the government injured by an external project could only collect damages, and
not enjoin the project, matters would proceed more expeditiously.
113. MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE § 8-101 (1976).
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level. Local government is much more balkanized, and thus a particu-
lar dispute is more likely to involve large numbers of governments. If
the City of Cicero is lax in controlling its criminal element, or the Vil-
lage of Arlington Heights pursues exclusionary zoning, scores of other
cities in Cook County, Illinois, may suffer. In addition, by one count,
thirty-two metropolitan areas spill across state lines; 1 4 in these areas,
interlocal disputes may also be interstate ones." 5 Nevertheless, some
interlocal disputes-like zoning changes near common boundaries-
may fit the niche where public property rights are the best internaliza-
tion device available. If so, the Model Land Development Code, in
choosing preemptive state regulation as the sole corrective for in-
termunicipal cost spillovers, has opted for an unnecessarily centralized
form of decisionmaking.
IV. SOME THOUGHTS ON BENEFIT SPILLOVERS
The redefinition of property rights to facilitate intergovernmental bar-
gaining is also a possibility when a government (or its citizenry) exhib-
its above-normal behavior and thereby confers benefits on its
neighbors. Just as a government could be made liable for cost spil-
lovers, it could be entitled to obtain restitution-preferably partial res-
titution' '6-when it confers benefits.
A large number of private actors may conceivably combine to pro-
duce a flow of benefit spillovers. For example, dozens of Springfield
industrialists might jointly agree to build an in-stream aeration system
for the Connecticut River that would not only bring pollution down to
normal levels, but also clean the waters to such a degree that the river
would become one of the recreational jewels of New England. A pure
private property rights approach to internalizing these benefits would
involve a class action for restitution brought by the industrialists
against the class of benefited riparians. A pure public property rights
approach adhering to the Rule of the Highest Level would call for
Massachusetts to have rights against Connecticut.
The passthrough issue would have been faced if either a private or
114. G. BREAK, supra note 1, at 192.
115. For instances of litigation between units of local government situated in different states,
see note 61 supra. If the spillovers at issue in these cases had multiple private sources and victims,
the Rule of the Highest Level would create affirmative rights and duties only in state governments.
116. The benefits are being forced on unconsenting outsiders who may value them at less than
the market-clearing price. Cf Ellickson, supra note 42, at 735-37 (because nuisance activities
result in forced exchanges, a damage award in a nuisance case should be greater than the diminu-
tion in the market value of the plaintiff's land).
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public property rights system were used."t 7 The relative merits of the
two systems would depend primarily on their allocative and adminis-
trative efficiency. The use of either would also require development of
substantive rules of restitution, including ones to aid identification of
the "cheapest benefit initiator." Similar to placing liabilities on cheap-
est cost avoiders, granting rights to restitution to cheapest benefit initia-
tors reduces the transaction costs of settlements and/or the number of
deadweight losses arising from failures in the exchange process. For
reasons presented in the prior discussion of cost spillovers, the potential
advantage of using property rights systems, as opposed, say, to grants-
in-aid, to internalize benefits is decentralization of enforcement.
The above hypothetical involving an industrialist-financed in-
stream aeration system is rather fanciful. The dynamics of freeloading
usually prevent large numbers of private individuals from combining
to produce a flow of benefits. Consequently, public goods are mostly
produced by governments. Therefore, most problems of pervasive ben-
efit spillovers can be expected to arise from government regulatory and
proprietary programs-eg., mosquito abatement, the provision of
parks or libraries, and national defense.
When a private party bestows benefits on a person who has not
asked for them, current law rarely entitles the private party to recover
restitution for their value."' Given this situation, it should not be sur-
prising that courts and legislatures have not. heretofore created restitu-
117. The rules developed in benefit spillover cases may affect the optimal legal rules in cost-
spillover cases. A prior discussion based the need to create exclusive bargaining agents in large
number cost spillover cases on possible freeloader and holdout problems that would arise, even
when damages is the exclusive remedy, when the legal system lacks mechanisms to internalize
benefit spillovers. See text accompanying notes 15-23 su ra. If benefit internalization mecha-
nisms were created, and benefits were also passed through to individual benefactors and liabilities
to individual beneficiaries, an individual plaintiff (or defendant) could be permitted to sever its
claim (liability) from the group litigation in large number cost spillover cases.
The exhumation of a prior example will help illustrate this point. Suppose that some Spring-
field industrialists were considering financing a fabulous in-stream aeration system that would
both cure past pollution and confer future benefits on Connecticut riparians. Their ability to
recoup future benefits would mean that they would not worry about a riparian who severed his
damage claim and adopted a holdout strategy because they could set off future benefits conferred
on him against their liabilites to him for past damage.
Similarly, if restitutionary recoveries are passed through to individual benefactors, incentives
to freeload would be less powerful and less likely to prevent industrialists from participating in a
joint venture. Actual participants would be compensated for future benefits conferred, while non-
participants would not. Because incentives for group action would be present, there would be less
need to compel all industrialists to use the same exclusive bargaining agent.
118. See RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 106 (1937); Dawson, The Serf-Serving Intermed-
dler, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1409 (1974).
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tionary rights between governments. For example, international
lawyers would be dumbfounded if the United States sued Canada to
recoup benefits conferred by United States' expenditures on national
defense.
As with cost spillovers, the niche where public property rights
would be the optimal internalization system for benefit spillovers is
probably small. The governmental activities most likely to deserve the
conferral of a right to restitution from another government would be
ones involving the production of impure public goods when: (1) a large
number of individual outsiders benefit from the activity; (2) it would be
administratively expensive to impose user fees on these individual out-
siders; and (3) the individual outsiders happen to reside within the
boundaries of a few general purpose units of government. All three
conditions would be met if Massachusetts (a more realistic sponsor
than the Springfield industrialists) installed a fabulously effective in-
stream aeration system in the Connecticut River just above the Con-
necticut border. In such a case it might possibly make sense to entitle
Massachusetts to partial restitution from Connecticut for the benefits
conferred upon Connecticut residents.
Another example at the local government level may prove instruc-
tive. The small City of Santa Monica, California, has a wonderful
ocean beach of great appeal to the nearly three million residents of the
surrounding City of Los Angeles. To prevent outsiders from freeload-
ing on its beach services, Santa Monica might feel compelled either to
exclude nonresidents from its beach, or to charge nonresidents more
than residents for beach use. Both approaches would require the city to
take on the considerable administrative burden of checking the identity
of all beach users. The city could avoid that particular burden by im-
posing uniform user fees on all entrants. The administrative costs of
collecting uniform user fees, however, might be very high, and might
exceed the allocative gains the fees achieve by ending freeloading by
outsiders.
Suppose, however, that a California statute entitled Santa Monica,
whenever outsiders used its beach facilities, to obtain partial restitution
from the general purpose local governments in which those outsiders
resided. Santa Monica could then occasionally sample beach users to
determine their home cities and seek reimbursement from those gov-
ernments. Eventually Los Angeles and Santa Monica might reach a
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permanent cost-sharing agreement" 19
A cost-sharing agreement between Los Angeles and Santa Monica
might be negotiated, of course, even if Santa Monica did not have
rights to restitution.'20 When only a few informed parties are involved,
the Coase Theorem indicates that the definition of rights will not se-
verely affect allocative outcomes.' 2' Nevertheless, even in small
number cases, the proper structuring of intergovernmental restitution-
ary law to identify the cheapest benefit initiators may reduce both
transaction costs and the likelihood of failure in the exchange process.
If experience showed public property rights to be a useful internal-
ization system for interlocal benefit spillovers, a state could enact legis-
lation entitling its local governments to collect partial restitution in all
"niche" situations-which an administrative agency might be asked to
help define. This comprehensive statutory entitlement would then per-
mit the repeal of current ad hoc state grant-in-aid programs for local
facilities like parks and libraries which sometimes benefit many resi-
dents of a few neighboring municipalities.
There may be few, if any, niche situations. Because a government
can often readily impose user charges on individual outsiders who are
beneficiaries of its programs, the second niche condition is seldom met.
For example, a state-supported university can charge tuition for out-of-
state students at low administrative expense. Therefore, it would make
little sense for Congress to entitle a state to obtain partial restitution
from other states whose residents use the first state's university.
The third niche condition, which requires that individual outside
beneficiaries be residents of few governments, will also often limit use
of the public property rights approach. Benefit spillovers are often per-
vasive (especially when governments provide pure public goods).
When benefits are widespread, many governments would have to be
made defendants, and transaction costs would rapidly multiply. For
example, if North Dakota took steps to keep its air as pure as it now is,
119. The Santa Monica situation would fit the niche only if most outsiders using the beach
resided in a few outside cities. This is probably not the case.
120. In fact, both the County of Los Angeles and the State of California have agreed to subsi-
dize operation of Santa Monica's beach. In 1949, Santa Monica deeded the dry sand area of its
beach to the state in return for the state's promise to acquire land for parking areas. The city still
operates the beach. The state allows the city to keep all parking-fee revenue to help defray the
city's operating costs. The county provides lifeguard services at no cost to the city. Telephone
interview with Donald Arnett, Director of Recreation and Parks, City of Santa Monica, California
(June 21, 1978).
121. See Coase, supra note 10.
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many states to its east might benefit. Federal grants-in-aid to reward
North Dakota would therefore seem a better system than the creation
in North Dakota of restitutionary rights against its neighbors. 122
The problem of multiple governmental beneficiaries would often
be especially severe at the local level. Suppose that a small New En-
gland town could become a deepwater port for crude oil tankers. If it
did, refineries and other heavy industrial facilities would inevitably be
constructed within the town. Suppose further that all the environmen-
tal costs of these facilities would be internal to the town but that the
benefits of the facilities (ie., lower energy costs) would redound to all
of New England. Unless these external benefits could be internalized
in some way, the town could be expected to decline to become an oil
transshipment center. The benefits of cheaper energy would be so
widespread in this case that public property rights would seem to hold
little promise. As in the North Dakota example, the optimal internal-
ization system might be federal or state grants to reward the town for
sacrificing itself.'23 This would appear to be a more flexible, and dis-
tributionally just, system than preemptive state or federal regulation of
utility siting-the approach many states have recently been adopt-
in.24
CONCLUSION
The object of this Article is modest: to show that the proper definition
of property rights between neighboring governments may occasionally
help alleviate the misallocations and redistributions of resources that
can arise from interjurisdictional spillovers. Vicarious intergovern-
mental property rights have the miost promise in the narrow set of cases
in which large numbers of private parties are involved in both creating
a flow of spillovers and feeling their effects, and relatively few govern-
ments happen to be ready-made representatives for the private classes
on both sides of the flow.
122. The current approach to this type of problem is, as usual, higher-level regulation; the
Federal Clean Air Act sets limits on the degradation of air quality in pristine areas. 42 U.S.C.
§§ 7470-7479 (Supp. 1977).
123. Cf. O'Hare, "Not on My Block You Don't" Facility Siting and the Strategic Importance of
Compensation, 25 PuB. PoL'y 407 (1977) (suggesting scheme for compensating local governments
impacted by facilities that are locally noxious but beneficial to regional economy); Silverman,
Subsidizing Tolerancefor Open Communities, 1977 Wis. L. REv. 375 (proposing federal subsidies
payable to both a local government and its residents if the local government agrees to accept new
lower-income residents).
124. N. ROSENBAUM, LAND USE AND THE LEGISLATURES 44 (1976) (identifies 22 states with
some form of utility-siting legislation).
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Property rights between neighboring governments currently tend
to be vaguely and improperly defined. A legislative clarification and
reformulation of these rights would expedite intergovernmental bar-
gaining over spillovers, and offer an alternative to centralized regula-
tion. Public property rights warrant the test of experience in those
limited situations where they might possibly prove to be useful.

